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I. INTRODUCTION
Police officers are endowed with a mantle of power from the government
to enforce the laws and protect the people. They are field soldiers who enforce
the laws and preliminarily determine the guilt of those who break the law. The
state grants police officers the power to arrest and detain individuals until the
courts pass a final judgment of guilt for each alleged offender. Officers also
possess the authority to use deadly force in special circumstances that warrant
its use. Pragmatic, philosophical, and moral dilemmas surround the use of
deadly force by police officers while attempting to arrest suspected criminals.
The conundrum lies in determining when peace officers entrusted to secure
persons for judicial proceedings may hand down the unappealable judgment of
death on the street before guilt has been determined at trial.
Approximately twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court established greater restrictions on police use of deadly force than common law and

R
R
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many state statutes had previously imposed.1 The increased restrictions on
police shootings following the Garner decision seemed to result in a two-year
nationwide reduction in the number of felons2 killed by police officers in 1986
and 1987.3 Some statistical studies have shown that the rate of justifiable
homicides by police officers is positively related to factors such as birth rates,
number of welfare recipients, the overall homicide rate, or the rate of police
officers killed by civilians.4 Despite a significant reduction in the homicide
rate across America since the early 1990s,5 the number of police shootings has
not followed suit,6 leading to an increased rate of fatal police shootings per
homicide.7 From 2001 to 2005, however, the use of deadly force by police
officers in the United States decreased by nearly 10%.8
In the first seven months of 2006, a drastic increase occurred in the number of fatal officer-involved shootings by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department (“LVMPD”).9 The problem of police officers potentially using
unnecessary deadly force impacts the entire nation, but must be solved in each
community or possibly within the walls of each home. Therefore, this Note
focuses on the use of deadly force by LVMPD, the unique challenges facing
Las Vegas, and potential solutions for the Las Vegas community. It covers:
1

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
In general, officers may only use deadly force against suspected felons and not those
suspected of committing misdemeanors. See infra Part II.A.
3 JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, POLICING AND HOMICIDE, 1976-98: JUSTIFIABLE
HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS MURDERED BY FELONS 3 (2001), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ph98.pdf.
4 Richard R.E. Kania & Wade C. Mackey, Police Violence as a Function of Community
Characteristics, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 27-48 (1977); David Lester, Predicting the Rate of
Justifiable Homicide by Police Officers, 16 POLICE STUD. 43, 43 (1993) [hereinafter Lester,
Predicting]; David Lester, A Study of Civilian-Caused Murders of Police Officers, 6 INT’L J.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 373, 373-78 (1978).
5 The U.S. murder and non-negligent homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants has decreased
by nearly forty-three percent during the fifteen-year period from 1991 through 2005. FBI,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2005, at
tbl.1 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_01.html [hereinafter 2005
CRIME REPORT tbl.1]
6 The killing of felons by police has decreased approximately seven percent during the fifteen-year period from 1991 to 2005. FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2005, at tbl.13 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
05cius/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_13.html [hereinafter 2005 CRIME
REPORT tbl.13]; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Homicide Trends
in the U.S., http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/justifytab.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2008) [hereinafter Homicide Trends in the U.S.].
7 The rate of fatal officer-involved shootings per homicide has increased by over thirty-eight
percent during the fifteen-year period from 1991 through 2005. In 2005, fatal officerinvolved shootings accounted for over two percent of all homicides in America. 2005 CRIME
REPORT tbl.1, supra note 5; 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.13, supra note 6; Homicide Trends in
the U.S., supra note 6.
8 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.13, supra note 6.
9 By July 9, 2006, the LVMPD already shot fifty percent more people than in 2005 and was
on pace to kill twice as many people as in 2005. Francis McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings: Police Defend Practices, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 9, 2006, at 1B [hereinafter
McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings]; Francis McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting: Hail of
Fire at Store, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 10, 2006, at 1A [hereinafter McCabe, Fatal LV
Police Shooting].
2
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(1) a history of the common law of Nevada regarding the use of deadly force to
arrest felons; (2) Nevada’s statutory history pertaining to the use of deadly
force; (3) the current police policies regarding use of deadly force in Las
Vegas; (4) a brief history of officers feloniously killed in Nevada; (5) a chronicling of the most noteworthy Las Vegas officer-involved shootings occurring in
2006; (6) a detailed description of the Clark County Coroner’s inquest process,
a discussion of the controversy surrounding the current process, and suggestions on how to improve the existing system; and (7) numerous potential factors
behind the sudden increase in officer-involved shootings in Las Vegas with
practical suggestions on how to cure the problems.
II. DEADLY FORCE UNDER COMMON LAW

AND

NEVADA STATUTES

A. The Common Law
The common law granted police officers the authority to arrest those who
broke the law and to use the amount of force necessary to effectuate arrests.
Under the common law, an officer could use deadly force only when its use
was a “necessity” to prevent a felon from fleeing or resisting arrest.10 However, the law did not excuse an officer who killed a fleeing felon unless he
exercised “diligence and caution” when securing the prisoner.11 Officers could
never use deadly force when a misdemeanor suspect fled but could use it sometimes when he resisted.12 The Rex v. Finnerty court explained the difference in
treatment for fleeing felons and suspects of a misdemeanor as follows: “In case
of misdemeanor, resistance will justify killing, though flight will not; for in
such case the law considers it better that the accused should escape, than that
life should be taken.”13
Officers, or even citizens, could also take the life of a criminal in the act of
committing a felony or in preventing the commission of a felony.14 The In re
Neagle Court handled a remarkable situation where a federal marshal prevented
the killing of Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court.15 David Neagle, a U.S. marshal, shot and killed David Terry to prevent him from killing
Justice Field while he ate breakfast at a train station. David Terry became
upset with Justice Field after the Supreme Court ruled on a domestic dispute
between David and Sarah Terry. Before being removed from the courtroom,
David Terry threatened to assault Justice Field. Years later, while Justice Field
was traveling in California for work purposes, David Terry approached him in
the train station dining room. Neagle saw Terry hit Justice Field in the face.
Terry then reached for his knife, at which point Neagle shot and killed Terry.16
California convicted Neagle of murder, and the Supreme Court granted his
habeas corpus petition. In so doing, the Court stated, “[T]here is positive law
10

Jackson v. State, 5 So. 690, 692 (Miss. 1888).
Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720, 722 (1879).
12 Id. at 721.
13 Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant III, 22 MICH. L. REV. 798, 808-09 (1924)
(quoting Rex v. Finnerty (1830) 1 Crawf. & Dix. (Ir.) 167 note b, Bushe, C.J.).
14 Id. at 809-10; see also In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
15 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 5.
16 Id. at 42-53.
11
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investing the marshals . . . with powers which not only justify what Marshal
Neagle did . . . but which imposed it upon him as a duty.”17
The principles of the common law allowed officers to use whatever force
necessary, including deadly force, to arrest a felon.18 The common law rule
manifested society’s attitude toward felons in fifteenth century England and
eighteenth century America.19 During those periods, being convicted of any
felony20 drew the death penalty because the jails were inadequate to hold dangerous criminals.21 The use of deadly force to arrest felons simply sped up the
penal process and excluded the trial.22 “It made little difference if the suspected felon were killed in the process of capture since, in the eyes of the law,
he had already forfeited his life by committing the felony.”23
B. Early Nevada Statutory History
Nevada, along with at least six other states in the Ninth Circuit, codified
the common law rule allowing officers to use deadly force to arrest a felon by
1976.24 The early Nevada statutes from 1911 authorized peace officers and
private persons to make an arrest for public offenses committed in their presence.25 Nevada law justified homicide
[by a] public officer, or person acting under his command and in his aid, in the
following cases:
1. In obedience to the judgment of a competent court.
2. When necessary to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal
process, mandate or order of a court of officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty.
3. When necessary in retaking an escaped or rescued prisoner who has been
committed, arrested for, or convicted of a felony; or in arresting a person who has
committed a felony and is fleeing from justice; or in attempting, by lawful ways or
means, to apprehend a person for a felony actually committed; or in lawfully suppressing a riot or preserving the peace.26
17

Id. at 68.
Floyd R. Finch, Jr., Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering Constitutional
Review, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 364-67 (1976) (discussing the common law history of deadly force as used by law officers).
19 Id. at 365.
20 Common-law felonies included murder, rape, manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, mayhem,
burglary, arson, prison break, and larceny. Id.
21 Hugo Adam Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH
L. REV. 201, 232.
22 Finch, supra note 18, at 365.
23 William Henry Sandweg III, The Use of Deadly Force in Arizona by Police Officers,
1973 L. & SOC. ORD. 481, 482.
24 Finch, supra note 18, at 368 n.30 (listing the deadly force statutes in Ninth Circuit states
as of 1976: ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.090 (1970); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-461 (1972);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-610 (1970); MONT. CODE.
ANN. § 94-2512 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.140(3)(b) (1973); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.48.160 (1961), § 9A.16.040(3) (1975)).
25 NEV. REV. LAWS §§ 6953-6954 (1912) (reprinting of Crimes and Punishments Act of
1911).
26 Crimes and Punishments Act of 1911 § 131, NEV. REV. LAWS § 6396.
18
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Private persons could also use deadly force when a felon resisted a lawful
citizen’s arrest.27 In Smith v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court heard a civil
case involving a posse who sought to collect a reward offered by the Nevada
Legislature.28 In January 1911, a band of seven Native Americans allegedly
murdered four men in Washoe County, Nevada. The state legislature quickly
authorized a reward for the arrest and conviction of the person or persons guilty
of the murder. Shortly thereafter, Governor Tasker L. Oddie offered a reward
of $1000 in each case. Eight men formed a posse, found the Native Americans,
and attempted to arrest them. The posse killed all seven Native Americans
when they resisted arrest. The Smith court penned only two short sentences to
justify the posse’s killing of the Native Americans—including two women and
a young boy—before determining the reward issue.29
In 1931, the Nevada Legislature codified the common law fleeing felon
rule, with a slight twist, and it remained in effect for over sixty years.30 The
newly added provision provided:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed . . . [b]y any person, when committed
upon the person of another who is engaged in the commission of a felony or an
attempted felony, or who after the commission or attempted commission of any such
felony, is fleeing from the premises or resisting lawful pursuit and arrest, within
twenty miles of the premises where such felony was committed or attempted to be
committed.31

The statute codified the common law fleeing felon rule but limited lawful pursuit to a twenty-mile radius surrounding the crime scene. One state assemblyman suggested to the Nevada Legislature that section 200.160(3) was enacted
because most pursuits occurred on horseback.32 The statute seems to have limited the use of deadly force to pursuits that took place shortly after the felony or
attempted felony instead of pursuits that took place days, weeks, or even
months later.
C. Garner’s Effect on Nevada Statutes
Nevada’s statutes regarding the use of deadly force by police officers
remained virtually unchanged until the early 1990s.33 The 1993 Nevada Legis27 NEV. REV. LAWS §§ 6396-6397; NEV. REV. LAWS § 6954; see also Smith v. State, 151 P.
512, 514 (Nev. 1915).
28 Smith, 151 P. at 512.
29 “The persons composing the posse were authorized to make an arrest of the murderers.
The taking of the lives of the murderers, while resisting arrest by force of arms, was also
justifiable.” Id. at 513 (citation omitted).
30 See 1931 NEV. STAT. 160; NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.1455 (2007).
31 Compare 1931 NEV. STAT. 160, with NEV. COMPILED LAWS § 10080 (1929), and Crimes
and Punishments Act of 1911 § 133, NEV. REV. LAWS § 6398.
32 Assemblyman Williams told the Legislature that the statute originated in 1911 when in
fact the Legislature did not codify the fleeing felon rule until 1931. The minutes are inaccurate because they state that Nevada Revised Statutes section 200.160(3) authorized the use of
deadly force in pursuits of over twenty miles instead of within twenty miles of the felony or
attempted felony. Revises Provisions Relating to Use of Deadly Force to Effect Arrest:
Hearing on Assemb. B. 209 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 1993 Leg., 67th Sess. (Nev.
1993), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/67th/93minutes/S_JD_514.html [hereinafter S.
Comm. Hearings].
33 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.140.
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lature enacted substantial changes to Nevada’s justifiable homicide statutes in
response to a 1985 United States Supreme Court decision that altered the common law fleeing felon rule.34 In Tennessee v. Garner, two police officers
responded to a “prowler inside call” in Memphis, Tennessee.35 Once at the
scene, one officer heard a door slam and saw a person run across the backyard.
The suspect stopped at a six-foot-high chain link fence and crouched on the
ground. The officer shined his flashlight on the suspect and became “reasonably sure” that the teenage boy was unarmed.36 When the officer moved closer
and yelled “police, halt,” the suspect began to climb the fence.37 In order to
prevent the boy from escaping, the officer fatally shot him in the back of the
head. Upon a search of the boy’s body, police found ten dollars and a purse
taken from the house.38 At that time, the Tennessee statutes authorized the
officer’s use of deadly force under those circumstances.39
The Supreme Court invalidated Tennessee’s statute on Fourth Amendment
grounds, defining the unnecessary use of deadly force as an unreasonable
seizure.40 Justice White explained that courts need to weigh the intrusion on an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights and the importance of the government’s
interests.41 He reasoned further that deadly force invades the individual’s right
and society’s interest in judicially determining guilt and punishment.42 The
Court stated:
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever
the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony
suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to
the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him
does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.43

Nevada’s response to Garner occurred over seven years later, but the Legislature eventually protected the State from similar litigation over its unconstitutional statutes. In July 1992, a Nevada assemblyman proposed Assembly Bill
20944 to “parallel the language in state law with the language contained in the
1985 Supreme Court” ruling of Tennessee v. Garner.45 The Nevada Senate
also considered the potential cost of litigating future cases that would likely
34

S. Comm. Hearings, supra note 32; Revises Provisions Relating to Use of Deadly Force
to Effect Arrest, Hearing on Assemb. B. 209 Before Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 1993 Leg.,
67th Sess. (Nev. 1993), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/67th/93minutes/A_JD_
303.html [hereinafter Assemb. Comm. Hearings].
35 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 4-5. Tennessee’s statute provided that “[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest
the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to
effect the arrest.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982).
40 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7, 22.
41 Id. at 8.
42 Id. at 9.
43 Id. at 11.
44 LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, LEGAL DIV., LIST OF BILL DRAFTS REQUESTED FOR THE
1993 LEGISLATIVE SESSION 31 (1993), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/67th/1993%20
FINAL%20BDR%20LIST.pdf.
45 Assemb. Comm. Hearings, supra note 34.
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challenge the then current statutes under Garner.46 After lengthy discussions
in the State Assembly and Senate and modifications to the proposed language,
Assembly Bill 209 unanimously passed and went into effect June 29, 1993.47
The bill’s passage resulted in the addition of Nevada Revised Statutes
(“NRS”) section 171.1455, a significant omission from NRS section 200.140,
and completely eliminated NRS section 200.160(3).48 Section 171.1455
provides:
If necessary to prevent escape, an officer may, after giving a warning, if feasible, use deadly force to effect the arrest of a person only if there is probable cause to
believe that the person:
1. Has committed a felony which involves the infliction or threat of serious
bodily harm or the use of deadly force; or
2. Poses a threat of serious bodily harm to the officer or others.49

The newly passed bill omitted significant portions in subsection three of NRS
section 200.140 with the following language remaining: “[w]hen necessary:
(a) [i]n retaking an escaped or rescued prisoner who was been committed,
arrested for, or convicted of a felony; (b) [i]n attempting, by lawful ways or
means, to apprehend or arrest a person; or (c) [i]n lawfully suppressing a riot or
preserving the peace.”50 Assemblyman Williams recommended the removal of
NRS section 200.160(3) because in today’s society it could cause problems for
any officer acting under this statute.51
D. Nevada Case Law Under Post-Garner Statutes
Nevada state courts have only decided one case under the post-Garner
Nevada statutes because most plaintiffs choose to file suit based on federal
statutes in the U.S. District Courts.52 In State v. Weddell, the Nevada Supreme
Court heard an appeal by the government after a district court dismissed the
government’s pending criminal charges against a private citizen.53 In October
1997, a late-model Chevrolet Blazer entered Rolland P. Weddell’s construction
business property. One of Weddell’s employees, Cole, approached the vehicle.
The vehicle then accelerated, turned toward Cole, and struck him. The passen46

Senator Lawrence E. Jacobsen referred to an unidentified Nevada case in which a prisoner was shot while attempting to climb a prison fence when there were enough officers at
the base of the fence to apprehend the prisoner. Senator Jacobsen stated that the case went to
trial and cost the state over $300,000 to defend. S. Comm. Hearings, supra note 32.
47 Assemb. 209, 1993 Leg., 67th Sess. (Nev. 1993), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/
67th (follow “Bill Histories” hyperlink; then search for “Assembly Bill 209”).
48 S. Comm. Hearings, supra note 32; Assemb. Comm. Hearings, supra note 34; see NEV.
REV. STAT. § 171.1455 (1993); id. § 200.140; id. § 200.160.
49 NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.1455.
50 Id. § 200.140.
51 S. Comm. Hearings, supra note 32.
52 See Palm v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 142 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished
table decision); Warren v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 111 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished table decision); Milling v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 67 F.3d 307 (9th
Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision); Paiva v. City of Reno, 939 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Nev.
1996).
53 State v. Weddell, 27 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2001).
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ger in the vehicle threatened Cole and asked where they could find Cole’s
daughter. Cole then reported the incident to Weddell and the police.54
Weddell learned that several individuals were looking for Cole’s daughter
in relation to a drug transaction. Weddell obtained an address for those individuals and provided the information to the police. Dissatisfied with the police
response, Weddell drove to the address and called police dispatch when he
found a Blazer matching the description given by Cole. After fifteen minutes
with no police response, Weddell saw a man, James Bustamonte, and a woman
exit the house and walk toward the Blazer. Weddell parked his vehicle behind
the Blazer to prevent it from leaving the scene, approached the vehicle with a
gun pointed at Bustamonte, and ordered him to put his hands on the hood. A
short verbal dispute erupted, Bustamonte turned and ran, and Weddell fired
several shots at him. The police arrested Weddell and he was charged with
assault with a deadly weapon and discharging a firearm at another. The district
court granted Weddell’s motion to dismiss the charges.55
The Nevada Supreme Court determined that Weddell did not have an
absolute common law or statutory right to use deadly force to make an arrest.56
The court declared that the Nevada Legislature clearly abrogated the common
law fleeing felon rule in 1993 when it repealed NRS section 200.160(3) and
simultaneously enacted section 171.1455.57 The court reasoned that the Legislature’s abolishment of the common law fleeing felon rule and the narrowing of
police use of deadly force showed a clear disavowal for “the unbridled use of
deadly force.”58
Weddell petitioned for rehearing but the Nevada Supreme Court denied
his petition.59 Weddell then petitioned for en banc consideration, and the court
granted his motion to consider the case as a matter of first impression under the
new statutes.60 The en banc court followed the same reasoning as the threejustice panel and ruled Weddell could be prosecuted for the unnecessary use of
deadly force. The court clearly held that in attempting an arrest under NRS
section 171.126, a private citizen could use no more force than “necessary and
reasonable” to secure the criminal.61 The legislative changes coupled with the
two Weddell decisions have unequivocally eradicated the common law fleeing
felon rule in Nevada.
III. THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT’S USE
FORCE POLICY

OF

The LVMPD, like other police forces, has a written policy regarding the
use of deadly force by its officers. The applicable portions of the LVMPD’s
policy provide:
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 452.
Id. at 452-53.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 452.
State v. Weddell, 43 P.3d 987, 988 (Nev.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1001 (2002).
Id. at 988-90.
Id. at 988.
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Department members are not authorized to draw or display their firearms,
except for training at the firearms range, unless the circumstances create reasonable
belief that it may be necessary to use the firearm in conformance with this order.
Before using a firearm, department members will, whenever feasible, identify themselves and state their intention to shoot. Members are to fire their weapons only to
stop and incapacitate an assailant from completing a potentially deadly act. Members
should shoot at the “center body mass” for maximum stopping effectiveness and
minimal danger to innocent bystanders.
...
Department members are authorized to use deadly force in accordance with
NRS 171.1455 to:
1. Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an
IMMEDIATE THREAT OF DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM;
2. Prevent the escape of a fleeing felon who the member has probable cause to
believe will pose A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO HUMAN LIFE if escape
should occur; and that the justification for the action must be CLEAR and
IMMEDIATE.62

The LVMPD follows certain post-incident procedures when a shooting
has occurred. An officer involved in a shooting must immediately notify his or
her supervisor or, if unavailable, another on-duty supervisor. The officer must
complete a Use of Force Report prior to the end of the shift. The officer’s
supervisor must conduct an investigation and help the officer complete the Use
of Force Report.63 When an officer uses deadly force, the LVMPD typically
places all officers involved on paid administrative leave.64 The officers who
used deadly force are also subject to scrutiny through the Clark County Coroner’s inquest process (if the suspect died as a result of the officer’s use of
deadly force) and the LVMPD’s Use of Force Review Board.65
IV. OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED

IN

NEVADA

AND THE

UNITED STATES

A brief historical overview of feloniously killed police officers is necessary to paint a clearer picture of any potential link between feloniously killed
officers and officer-involved shootings. Violence against police officers has a
long history in Nevada with the first reported killing of an officer taking place
in 1861.66 In 1863, two more officers were shot and killed during an encounter
with an outlaw in Virginia City.67 Since it gained statehood in 1864, Nevada
62 LAS VEGAS, NEV., POLICE CODE § 6/002.00 (2007), available at http://www.news.eye
witnessnews8.com/deadly_force.pdf.
63 Id.
64 Brian Allen, Metro Launches Investigation into Taser Death, KLAS TV, June 8, 2005,
http://www.klas-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=3444256.
65 Francis McCabe, Department Clears Detectives Who Fatally Shot Teen Suspect, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 26, 2006, at 1B; Clark County Coroner Index, http://www.co.clark.nv.
us/CORONER/inquests.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
66 Carson County Sheriff John L. Blackburn was stabbed to death while attempting to take a
murder suspect into custody. The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., Sheriff John L. Blackburn, http://www.odmp.org/officer.php?oid=1900 (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
67 Officers Thomas Reed and Dennis McMahon were both shot in the chest and killed by
the same suspect who was later acquitted at trial. On an interesting side note, Samuel Clemens—better known as Mark Twain—heard the shooting of these two officers. The Officer
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has seen an additional fifty-eight officers feloniously killed, averaging just over
four officers feloniously killed per decade.68
FIGURE 1: NUMBER

OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED
DECADE (1860-2007)69
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In Las Vegas, felons murdered five officers in the original Las Vegas
Police Department between 1905 and 1967.70 In addition, one officer in the
Clark County Sheriff’s Department was feloniously killed in 1928 and another
in 1957.71 Since the creation of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
in 1973,72 another four officers have been feloniously killed in the line of
duty.73 The most recent officer killing occurred in February 2006 when a suspect shot Sergeant Henry Prendes in the head point blank during a standoff
with police.74 The Prendes murder drew national attention, caused local grief
for the loss, and united the Las Vegas community to honor and celebrate his
life.75
Down Memorial Page, Inc., Virginia City Police Department, http://www.odmp.org/agency.
php?agencyid=4713 (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
68 The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., Nevada, http://www.odmp.org/browse.php?abbr
=NV (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
69 Id.
70 The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., Las Vegas Police Department, http://www.odmp.
org/agency.php?agencyid=2077 (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
71 The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., Clark County Sheriff’s Department, http://www.
odmp.org/agency.php?agencyid=703 (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
72 In 1973, the Las Vegas Police Department merged with the Clark County Sheriff’s
Department to form the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, which serves within the
Las Vegas city limits and the unincorporated areas of Clark County. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, About Us, Consolidation, http://www.lvmpd.com/about/consolidation.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
73 The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department,
http://www.odmp.org/agency.php?agencyid=2076 (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
74 See infra Part V.C.
75 See Lynette Curtis, Thousands Mourn Officer, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 8, 2006, at 1A;
Lawrence Mower, Residents Want Street Renamed for Officer, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 4,
2006, at 1A; John L. Smith, Commentary, Cowardly Violence Takes a Man Who Lived ‘To
Protect and Serve,’ LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 8, 2006, at 1B. U.S. Representative Jon Porter
from Nevada recently sponsored the Sergeant Henry Prendes Memorial Act of 2006 to
amend Title 18 of the United States Code to include federal penalties for killing federally
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Over the past thirty years, from 1976 to 2005, felons have murdered an
average of seventy-three police officers each year in the United States.76 In
Nevada, twelve police officers were feloniously killed during the same period,
averaging two police officers every five years.77 However, national statistics
show a noticeable decline in the annual number of officers feloniously killed
because fewer than seventy-three officers have been murdered each year from
1995 to 2005.78 In the past decade, from 1996 to 2005, the national average of
officers feloniously killed has dropped to just over fifty-seven per year.79 During that same period, three officers were murdered by felons in Nevada, averaging less than one every three years.80 The data, as shown in the following
figure, clearly shows a national and statewide trend toward fewer officers murdered by felons over the past thirty years.
FIGURE 2: NUMBER
12
10

OF

OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED NATIONWIDE
NEVADA (1976-2005)81

AND IN

Officers Murdered by Felons (Nationwide) (in tens)
Officers Murdered by Felons (Nevada)

8
6
4
2
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

0

Year

V. OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS

IN

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

IN

2006

During the first seven months of 2006, the LVMPD used deadly force
more frequently than in recent years, drawing significant media attention, public criticism, and even lawsuits. During the period from 2001 to 2005, the
LVMPD averaged approximately nineteen officer-involved shootings per year
funded public safety officers. The Act would punish anyone who “kills, or attempts or conspires to kill, a federally funded public safety officer” engaged in official duties. The bill
provides for a minimum sentence of thirty years imprisonment and a possibility of the death
penalty when the offense results in an officer’s death. H.R. 4732, 109th Cong. (2006).
76 BROWN & LANGAN, supra note 3, at 19; FBI, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED – 2005, at tbl.1
(2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2005/table1.htm [hereinafter LEOKA
2005].
77 The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., Nevada, supra note 68.
78 BROWN & LANGAN, supra note 3, at 19; LEOKA 2005, supra note 76.
79 LEOKA 2005, supra note 76.
80 The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., Nevada, supra note 68.
81 BROWN & LANGAN, supra note 3, at 3, 19; LEOKA 2005, supra note 76; The Officer
Down Memorial Page, Inc., Nevada, supra note 68.
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with an average of approximately eight resulting in fatal wounds to suspects.82
By July 9, 2006, the LVMPD engaged in nineteen officer-involved shootings
with nine fatal incidents in 2006.83 In July, the FBI initiated a civil rights
investigation into one unidentified officer-involved shooting.84 By July 2006,
public concern and criticism over the LVMPD’s perceived overuse of deadly
force reached a peak, while public confidence in the LVMPD sunk to new
depths.85 Much of the public also regarded the Clark County Coroner’s Inquest
process—the mechanism used to review whether officers’ use of deadly force
was justified, excusable, or criminal—as little more than a rubber stamp for
officers’ actions.86 The Clark County Commission announced a review of the
coroner’s inquest process in response to public indignation over the increase in
officer-involved shootings.87
Once the public outcry, the pressure from other governmental agencies,
and the civil rights lawsuits reached their climax in mid-July, the LVMPD shot
only six more people with no fatal incidents over the remaining five-and-onehalf months in 2006. The LVMPD’s final officer-involved shooting totals for
2006 were twenty-five shootings with nine fatal incidents.88 The sharp decline
in the LVMPD’s use of deadly force after mid-July may have been nothing
more than a coincidence, but LVMPD officers may have responded to the harsh
criticism and FBI investigation by exercising greater control before using
deadly force. Regardless of the reason behind the sudden reduction, the public
questioned the LVMPD’s use of deadly force in numerous fatal shootings during 2006, but the Swuave Lopez incident drew more attention and criticism
than any other incident.
A. Handcuffed, Unarmed Suspect Shot Twice in Back and Killed
On May 13, 2006, LVMPD homicide detectives arrested Swuave Lopez
and James Carter, Jr. as suspects in the murder of Kyle Staheli.89 An officer
searched Lopez, confiscated a 45-caliber handgun, handcuffed him, and placed
him in the passenger seat of Detective Jim Mitchell’s unmarked squad car.90
Detective Mitchell also wrapped a seat belt around Lopez’s right arm and buckled it to secure Lopez in the car.91 Once Detective Mitchell had placed Lopez
in the squad car, he walked to the vehicle’s trunk to retrieve something and to
82

McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9.
Id.; McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9. At this rate of officer-involved
shootings, the LVMPD was on pace to shoot thirty-five people and kill sixteen of them.
84 Francis McCabe, Civil Rights Investigation: FBI Reviewing Only One Police Shooting,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 17, 2006, at 2B.
85 Edward Lawrence, Sheriff Young Reacts Strongly to Metro’s Use of Force, July 11, 2006,
KLAS TV, http://www.klas-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=5133493.
86 Mark Sayre, Concerns over Clark County Coroner’s Inquest Process, KLAS TV, Aug. 2,
2006, http://www.klas-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=5227018.
87 Francis McCabe, Shootings Spur Review, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 12, 2006, at 1A.
88 David Kihara, Police Kill Burglary Suspect in Residential Neighborhood, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Aug. 23, 2007, at 1B.
89 Las Vegas Police Officers Actions Found Justifiable, KLAS TV, June 12, 2006, http://
www.klas-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=4990822.
90 McCabe, supra note 65.
91 Id.
83
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converse with other officers for several minutes, without watching the suspects.92 Lopez was able to get his handcuffed hands from behind his back to
his front, free himself from the seat belt restraint, and open the car door.93
Detectives Hardy and Womack looked up and saw Lopez running away.
Apparently, without warning and at close range,94 they fatally shot him in the
back.95 On June 9, 2006, a seven-member Clark County Coroner’s inquest
jury96 took less than one hour to find unanimously that the shooting of Lopez
by Detectives Hardy and Womack was justifiable, instead of excused or criminal, homicide.97
Dissatisfied with the result of the coroner’s inquest process, Lopez’s father
retained a nationally recognized attorney, James Myart, Jr.,98 to bring a federal
civil rights suit against the police department.99 In a maneuver intended to
prevent Lopez’s father from bringing his lawsuit against the police department,
92
93

Id.; Las Vegas Police Officers Actions Found Justifiable, supra note 89.
McCabe, supra note 65; Las Vegas Police Officers Actions Found Justifiable, supra note

89.
94

At least three different officers testified concerning the distance from officers Hardy and
Womack to Lopez at the time of the shooting. Officer Hardy testified that he was approximately forty-five feet from Lopez when he fired his shot. Officer Womack testified that he
was between twenty-five and thirty feet from Lopez when he fired his weapon. A third
officer, Christopher Cannon, who did not fire at Lopez, testified that he was only six to eight
feet away from Lopez when officers Hardy and Womack fired their weapons. Officer Cannon’s testimony conflicted with the testimony given by officers Hardy and Womack who
both claimed that no one was close to Lopez when they fired their weapons. According to a
diagram shown during the hearing, the bullet casing from Womack’s gun was more than
twenty feet from where Lopez was struck by the bullet. Francis McCabe, Coroner’s Inquest:
Police Cleared in Teen’s Death, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 10, 2006, at 1A.
95 Las Vegas Police Officers Actions Found Justifiable, supra note 89; see also NAACP
Responds to Officer Involved Shooting, KLAS TV, June 14, 2006, http://www.klas-tv.com/
Global/story.asp?S=5033299.
96 See infra Part VI for a discussion of the Clark County coroner’s inquest process.
97 Las Vegas Police Officers Actions Found Justifiable, supra note 89. In Nevada,
[j]ustifiable homicide is the killing of a human being in necessary self-defense, or in defense of
habitation, property or person, against one who manifestly intends, or endeavors, by violence or
surprise, to commit a felony, or against any person or persons who manifestly intend and
endeavor, in a violent, riotous, tumultuous or surreptitious manner, to enter the habitation of
another for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person dwelling or
being therein.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120 (2007). Nevada provides additional circumstances specifically
for public officers in which homicide is justified, including the lawful arrest or apprehension
of a person. Id. § 200.140(3)(b). Excusable homicide by misadventure is defined as when
“[a] person doing a lawful act, without any intention of killing, yet unfortunately kills
another.” Id. § 200.180(1)(a). In Nevada, neither justifiable nor excusable homicides are
punishable under the law. Id. § 200.190. When a coroner’s inquest jury finds the person
was killed under circumstances not justifiable or excusable, the district attorney shall take
whatever actions he or she deems necessary. CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE § 2.12.160
(2006).
98 James Myart, Jr., represented the Lopez family in this matter. Mr. Myart represented
U.S. Representative Cynthia McKinney in her case resulting from a scuffle with the Capitol
Hill Police earlier in 2006. Deidre Walsh & Terry Frieden, Sources: McKinney Case Heading to Grand Jury, CNN.COM, Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/05/
mckinney.scuffle/.
99 Ky Plaskon, Civil Rights Attorney Threatens Lawsuit Against Las Vegas, KLAS TV, July
21, 2006, http://www.klas-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=5179210&pass=1#poll53773.
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the Police Protective Association offered to pay for attorneys in an attempt to
convince the family of Staheli (the victim Lopez allegedly murdered) to sue the
Lopez family.100 The Staheli family refused to railroad the Lopez family and
reported the police union’s behavior to the local media.101 As a result of the
police union’s actions, Myart threatened a lawsuit against Dave Kallas, the
leader of the police union, and demanded that Kallas step down.102 On August
4, 2006, the Lopez family filed a civil complaint in federal court against Sheriff
Bill Young, the LVMPD, and Officers Hardy, Womack, and Mitchell, seeking
approximately $23 million in damages.103
All officers involved in the Lopez incident also faced potential discipline
from the LVMPD for possibly violating department policies in the arrest and
fatal shooting of Lopez.104 In October 2006, the LVMPD’s Use of Force
Review Board (“UFRB”), comprised of four trained civilians and three members of the police department, cleared Officers Hardy and Womack for the
shooting of Lopez.105 However, the UFRB determined that Detective Mitchell’s conduct in securing Lopez may have violated the LVMPD’s policies.106
B. Man Shot and Killed When Stopped for Playing Loud Music
On July 4, 2006, in front of dozens, possibly hundreds, of tourists, another
locally infamous officer-involved shooting occurred on the Las Vegas Strip
near Bally’s Hotel and Casino.107 Tarance Hall, a thirty-one-year-old Las
Vegas resident, drove his car too far into a busy intersection on the Strip and
played his music too loudly for the likes of two officers patrolling on bicycles
as part of Operation Safe Strip.108 Soon after the officers pulled Hall over, he
became belligerent and started to drive away with Officer Noel Lefebvre hanging onto Hall’s driver’s side door.109 Hall drove approximately thirty feet
before crashing into a taxi and a barricade, which deployed the airbag and
knocked Officer Lefebvre, who was now partially inside the car, unconscious.110 Hall then put his vehicle in reverse and backed up toward the pursuing policeman, Officer Ryan McBride.111 Officer McBride fired one shot,
which incapacitated and fatally wounded Hall.112 Shortly after Hall was shot,
Officer Lefebvre gained consciousness, removed Hall from his car, threw him
100

Id.
Id.
102 Id.
103 Adrienne Packer, Police Killing Brings Lawsuit, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 5, 2006, at
1B; see also Lopez v. Young, No. 2:06-cv-00951-BES-GWF (D. Nev. filed Aug. 4, 2006).
104 Las Vegas Police Officers Actions Found Justifiable, supra note 89.
105 McCabe, supra note 65.
106 Id.
107 Metro Police Shoot Suspect on Las Vegas Strip, KLAS TV, July 6, 2006, http://www.
lasvegasnow.com/global/Story.asp?s=5113844; Lindsay Patterson, Victim’s Family Talks
About Fatal Las Vegas Strip Shooting, KLAS TV, July 10, 2006, http://www.klas-tv.com/
Global/story.asp?S=5122517.
108 Metro Police Shoot Suspect on Las Vegas Strip, supra note 107.
109 Id.
110 Id.; Patterson, supra note 107.
111 Metro Police Shoot Suspect on Las Vegas Strip, supra note 107.
112 Id.
101
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to the ground, and handcuffed him.113 On September 10, 2006, a Clark County
Coroner’s inquest jury found Officer McBride justified in his use of deadly
force against Hall.114 The determination by the UFRB was not made public.
However, on November 1, 2006, in response to the incident, Hall’s family—
mother and two children—filed a civil rights lawsuit against the LVMPD and
Officers McBride and Lefebvre.115
C. LVMPD Officers Kill Man After Suspect Murders Police Officer
A third officer-involved shooting receiving national attention occurred on
February 1, 2006. Neighbors in a typically peaceful neighborhood called the
police after twenty-one-year-old Amir Rashid Crump began beating his girlfriend with a stick in their front yard.116 Crump began firing at officers with an
assault rifle as soon as they arrived at the scene. Officer Henry Prendes was hit
four times and fell down onto Crump’s porch. Other officers took cover and
returned fire hoping to be able to retrieve Officer Prendes before he died from
his wounds. At that point, Crump stood directly over Officer Prendes and shot
a fatal round into his head.117 Officer William Marx arrived and returned fire
with his own rifle, but Crump struck him three times in the leg.118 As Crump
focused his fire on Officer Marx, another officer was able to fire a clear shot at
Crump, which brought him to his knees.119 Several other officers charged
Crump, shot him four more times, handcuffed him, pulled Prendes away, and
called for ambulances for Prendes and Crump.120 Officer Prendes had already
died from the head wound and Crump died before paramedics arrived.121 A
Clark County Coroner’s inquest jury found the officers were justified in their
use of deadly force against Crump.122
D. Other Notable LVMPD Police Shootings in 2006
Descriptions of several other noteworthy LVMPD officer-involved shootings occurring in 2006 are listed below to illustrate the frequency and depth of
the problem facing Las Vegas.
July 9, 2006: Police responded to a call for help and confronted Shawn
Collins at a local Circle K.123 Police claimed Collins pulled out a revolver that
caused five officers to fire a total of twenty-eight times with twenty-three of the
113

Id.
Coroner’s Inquest Clears Officer in Fatal Shooting, KLAS TV, Sept. 10, 2006, http://
www.klas-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=5357302.
115 Black v. McBride, No. 2:06-cv-01394-KJD-GWF (D. Nev. filed Nov. 1, 2006);
Adrienne Packer, Family Sues Police in Death of Driver, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 2, 2006,
at 4B.
116 Metro Officer Falls in the Line of Duty, KVBC TV, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.kvbc.com/
global/story.asp?s=4443042&ClientType=printable.
117 Omar Sofradzija, Valley Shootout: Rapper’s Killing Ruled Justified, LAS VEGAS REV.J., Mar. 18, 2006, at 1A.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9.
123 McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9.
114
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rounds striking him.124 However, Collins’ ex-wife (Joey Collins) who called
the police and was at the scene told a different story. She claimed that officers
had already drawn their weapons with one officer carrying a rifle before her exhusband exited the store.125 When Collins came out of the convenience store,
she said officers asked him for his identification. Officers began shooting
when Collins reached into his pocket.126 After the shooting, a witness saw one
of the officers kick Collins to see if he was alive, but he had died instantly.127
A coroner’s inquest jury took forty-five minutes to rule the officers’ actions
were justified.128 On October 31, 2006, Collins’ two ex-wives retained civil
rights attorney James Myart, Jr. and filed a federal lawsuit against Sheriff Bill
Young and the LVMPD.129
April 28, 2006: A burglary suspect, Aaron Jones, was shot and killed by
Officers John Wiggins and William Mosher as he attempted to flee the scene.
The coroner’s inquest jury took less than thirty minutes to determine the
officers’ use of deadly force was justified under the circumstances.130
March 13, 2006: When police responded to a call for help, John Jackman
ran at the officers with two knives.131 Officer Byron Bunitsky, without any
warning that deadly force would be used, immediately shot and killed Jackman.132 The seven-member jury, two women and five men, deliberated for
only fifteen minutes before returning with their verdict that Officer Bunitsky’s
use of deadly force was justified.133
February 9, 2006: Officers responded to a complaint, and Christopher
Hawkins fired at them when the officers attempted to confront him.134 The
officers called for backup and engaged in a five-hour stand-off with Hawkins.135 After Hawkins fired at officers again, the SWAT team shot Hawkins
twenty times.136 The coroner’s inquest jury took less than fifteen minutes
unanimously to find that the officers’ use of deadly force was justified.137

124

Id.; Adrienne Packer, $71 Million Civil Rights Lawsuit: Man’s Ex-Wives Sue Police,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 1, 2006, at 3B.
125 Packer, supra note 124.
126 Id.
127 McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9.
128 Francis McCabe, Clark County Coroner’s Inquest: Officers’ Actions Justified, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 30, 2006, at 2B.
129 Packer, supra note 124.
130 Brian Haynes, Coroner’s Inquest: Police Shooting Ruled Justified, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
June 24, 2006, at 2B.
131 Francis McCabe, Coroner’s Inquest: Shooting of 43-Year-Old Justified, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Apr. 22, 2006, at 3B.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Francis McCabe, Sniper Tells of Fatal Shots, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 12, 2006, at 1B.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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January 2, 2006: Five officers surrounded Santana Baca, shot him with a
Taser to incapacitate him, and removed him from under a car.138 Police then
shot and killed Baca after he allegedly pulled a nine-millimeter handgun from
his waistband.139 A coroner’s inquest jury found all three officers who discharged their weapons at the scene were justified in doing so.140
Police officers’ use of deadly force is not an issue unique to Las Vegas.
The 2005 FBI Uniform Crime Reports showed that officers around the country
justifiably killed 341 individuals.141 From 1976 to 2005, police justifiably
killed an average of 366 people each year, the vast majority of which are
males.142 The following chart shows the magnitude of the problem.
FIGURE 3: OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED COMPARED WITH INDIVIDUALS
JUSTIFIABLY KILLED BY OFFICERS, ANNUAL TOTALS143
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VI. CLARK COUNTY CORONER INQUEST PROCESS
The Clark County Coroner’s inquest process has come under heavy criticism from local civil rights groups and concerned citizens after the outbreak of
officer-involved shootings in early 2006.144 From 1976, when Clark County
began holding coroner’s inquests, through January 2007, 159 inquests were
138

Frank Curreri, Las Vegas Police Shootings: ‘We Were Prepared for a Shootout,’ LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 4, 2006, at 1B.
139 Id.
140 McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9.
141 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.13, supra note 6.
142 BROWN & LANGAN, supra note 3, at 3, 21; 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.13, supra note 6;
Homicide Trends in the U.S., supra note 6.
143 BROWN & LANGAN, supra note 3, at 3, 21; 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.1, supra note 5; 2005
CRIME REPORT tbl.13, supra note 6; LEOKA 2005, supra note 76; Homicide Trends in the
U.S., supra note 6.
144 Edward Lawrence, Coroner’s Inquest is a ‘Storytelling Exercise’ Says ACLU, KLAS
TV, July 11, 2006, http://www.klas-tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=5137019; Ky Plaskon, Coroner’s Inquest Process Under Fire, KLAS TV, July 6, 2006, http://www.klas-tv.com/Global/
story.asp?S=5121824; Sayre, supra note 86.
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held with only one jury finding an officer criminally negligent.145 Based on
these seemingly lopsided results, the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) are calling for radical changes to the procedure, but the police
union strongly objects to any changes in the current process.146 A brief
description of the current system’s foundation and procedural parts is necessary
to understand how Clark County would, and whether they should, enact any
potential changes to the current process.
A. Nevada’s Statutorily Established Coroner’s Inquest Process
Nevada statutes require the coroner to investigate any death that the coroner suspects to have occurred by unnatural means.147 The Clark County Code
specifies the basic requirements of the coroner’s inquest procedure.148 A coroner’s inquest is a fact-finding procedure held each time a law-enforcement
officer kills a person in the line of duty.149 The stated purpose of the coroner’s
inquest hearing is to “publicly bring forth all of the details surrounding the
incident causing [the] death.”150 Therefore, any proposed changes to the coroner’s inquest process would presumably have to come in the form of amendments to the Clark County Code.
The Clark County Code requires certain pre-hearing procedures to take
place. The Clark County Coroner initiates the coroner’s inquest process by
notifying the district attorney and the police department to request assistance in
the investigation.151 The coroner then designates a coroner’s inquest hearing
officer or Clark County magistrate as the presiding officer over the inquest.152
The presiding officer must meet with the coroner and a representative from the
district attorney’s office to determine the evidence and witnesses required for
the inquest.153 Other interested individuals may contact the presiding officer to
recommend witnesses and submit a written list of questions to ask the witnesses
at the inquest.154 The presiding officer must request a panel of fifteen people to
serve as potential inquest jurors.155

145 Abigail Goldman, Coroner’s Inquest of Police Shootings Out of Step, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Jan. 14, 2007, at 1.
146 David Kihara, Hearing Focuses on Coroner’s Inquests, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 11,
2007, at 1B.
147 NEV. REV. STAT. § 259.050(1) (2007).
148 CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE § 2.12.080 (2006).
149 Clark County Coroner Index, supra note 65.
150 Id.
151 CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE § 2.12.080(a).
152 Id. § 2.12.080(c).
153 Id. § 2.12.080(e).
154 Id. § 2.12.080(f).
155 Id. § 2.12.080(i).
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The Clark County Code also dictates the procedures followed in the
inquest hearing. The presiding officer must ensure that the inquest remains “an
investigatory proceeding and not an adversary proceeding.”156 The presiding
officer randomly selects seven jurors from the fifteen-member panel and conducts a voir dire examination of each juror.157 Only the presiding officer, representatives of the district attorney’s office, and the coroner’s jurors may ask
the witnesses any questions.158 However, a limited group of “interested parties” may submit questions in writing for the witnesses, which may or may not
be asked by the presiding officer.159 Typically, the police officers involved
volunteer to testify, and a prosecutor from the Clark County district attorney’s
office questions the officers.160 Jurors usually determine the outcome of the
hearing based solely on the explanations offered by the officers involved in the
shooting.161 The jury deliberates to determine whether the death was criminal,
excusable, or justifiable under the law with a four-to-three majority sufficient
for a verdict.162 Recent inquest juries have only deliberated from fifteen to
forty-five minutes before returning with justified verdicts.163
B. Clark County Coroner’s Inquest Controversy
The surging number of police shootings in the first half of 2006 coupled
with the nearly guaranteed justified verdicts from the coroner’s inquest hearing
created an atmosphere ripe for changing the Clark County Coroner’s inquest
process. Civil rights leaders and concerned citizens in Las Vegas spoke out
against the coroner’s inquest process by criticizing its one-sided nature.164
Gary Peck, executive director of the ACLU of Nevada, accused the current
coroner’s inquest process of appearing like nothing more than a “dog and pony
show” and called for changes.165 Although the stated purpose of the coroner’s
inquest process is to reveal the facts about the officer-involved shooting,166 the
current system allows the police officers to provide an unchallenged “police
version”167 of events that Gary Peck described as “relying on the sound of one
hand clapping.”168 As a result of the events in early 2006, Las Vegans lost
confidence in the existing system as an objective method of determining the
facts surrounding police use of deadly force.
156

Id. § 2.12.080(j).
Id. § 2.12.080(j)(1).
158 Id. § 2.12.080(j)(2).
159 Id.
160 Goldman, supra note 145.
161 Id.
162 CLARK COUNTY, NEV., CODE § 2.12.140.
163 See Haynes, supra note 130; McCabe, supra note 128; McCabe, supra note 131.
164 See Goldman, supra note 145; Adrian Arambulo, Coroner’s Inquest Process in the Spotlight, KLAS TV, Sept. 14, 2006, http://www.klas-tv.com/Global/story.asp?s=5403675; Lawrence, supra note 144.
165 Arambulo, supra note 164.
166 Clark County Coroner Index, supra note 65.
167 Goldman, supra note 145.
168 Id.
157
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By September 2006, the public uproar over the coroner’s inquest process
persuaded the Clark County Commission to assemble a panel of interested parties—including the LVMPD, the Clark County district attorney’s office, the
ACLU, and the NAACP—to work together to create a list of recommended
changes to the coroner’s inquest process.169 However, the Clark County commissioners would make the final decision on whether or not to implement any
recommended changes.170 The ACLU revealed the three changes it wanted
made to the system: (1) replace prosecutors from the Clark County district
attorney’s office with lawyers from the Nevada attorney general’s office as the
main questioners of police during the hearings; (2) require randomly selected
justices of the peace to act as hearing masters instead of lawyers from the community; and (3) allow family members and friends of those shot, or their counsel, to question the LVMPD officers during the hearings.171
The panel met on numerous occasions over the following four months to
discuss the recommendations it would make to the Clark County Commission
in public hearings on January 10-11, 2007. The panel achieved consensus on
the first two issues—replacing the prosecutors and hearing masters—but
reached a stalemate on whether to allow family and friends of the deceased to
question the LVMPD officers involved in the shootings.172 The ACLU’s Gary
Peck stated that the third issue was the “one non-negotiable part of any reform
package” and absent a compromise on this issue, the County may need to
“scrap[ ] the system entirely.”173 However, the Las Vegas Police Protective
Association (“LVPPA”) sharply opposed any questioning of LVMPD officers
by the families of the deceased because it could provide fodder for civil lawsuits.174 The negotiations broke down after the County published a letter containing false representations regarding the panel’s progress.175 Gary Peck
responded to the letter by publicly questioning the County’s “ability to facilitate the reforms needed to properly fix a badly broken inquest system.”176 The
panel did not reach a consensus before the County Commission’s January 1011, 2007 hearings and as a result made no recommendations at that time.
The panel continued to discuss changes to the coroner’s inquest system
during 2007. On November 20, 2007, the Clark County commissioners finally
adopted several changes to the Clark County Code relevant to the coroner’s
inquest procedures.177 The commissioners revised several definitions,
expanded the pool of interested parties allowed to submit questions to the pre169

Arambulo, supra note 164.
Id.
171 Id.; David Kihara, Police Shootings: Inquest Changes Proposed, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Sept. 13, 2006, at 1A [hereinafter Kihara, Inquest Changes Proposed]; David Kihara,
Inquest Reform Questioned, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 4, 2007, at 3B [hereinafter Kihara,
Inquest Reform Questioned].
172 David Kihara, Investigation of Shootings by Police: Inquest Reform Work Hits Snag,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 29, 2006, at 1B.
173 Id.
174 Id.; Goldman, supra note 145.
175 Kihara, Inquest Reform Questioned, supra note 171.
176 Id.
177 See Clark County, Nevada, Commission Agenda, Nov. 20, 2007, Items 94-95, http://
www.co.clark.nv.us/Commission/agenda.htm.
170
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siding officer, and set forth different procedures for officer-involved deaths,
such as requiring a qualified magistrate to act as the presiding officer.178 The
ACLU brought about only one of its three proposed changes and strongly criticized the amendments by characterizing them as “completely meaningless.”179
Robert Langford, a Las Vegas attorney that has represented the family of an
individual killed by the LVMPD, said Clark County would be better off getting
rid of the inquest system than making the changes it made because the system
is expensive and will continue to act as nothing more than a superficial means
to clear police officers of wrongdoing.180 On the other side of the debate,
Clark County Sheriff Doug Gillespie expressed his support of the changes, and
Commissioner Bruce Woodbury called the changes “meaningful” and “appropriate” while recognizing that both sides would not be satisfied with the
changes.181 Based on Commissioner Woodbury’s comments, the Clark County
commissioners seem to feel that the issue was rectified by these amendments
and the public discussion regarding the inquest system is over.
Despite Commissioner Woodbury’s feelings, the recent changes are not
enough to restore the public’s confidence in the LVMPD and the Clark County
inquest system. Admittedly, a consensus will be difficult to reach due to the
varying interests at stake and the myriad ways to review the use of deadly force
by police. A brief look at the systems being used by several other large cities
across the country shows a wide variety of methods to evaluate the use of
deadly force by police officers. Los Angeles sends the District Attorney
Response Team (“DART”), a special unit of investigative district attorneys, to
the scene of every officer-involved shooting.182 DART conducts an investigation of the shooting, and the district attorney’s office decides whether to charge
any of the involved officers criminally.183 In Phoenix, the district attorney’s
office determines if officers involved in shootings should be criminally charged
based on evidence collected by police investigators and prosecutors.184 Prosecutors may interview the family members of the person killed by police if they
feel it is relevant.185 In New York City, prosecutors from the district attorney’s
office are appointed as counsel to represent the decedent’s family and the
officer responsible for the death.186 Each side is questioned before a grand
jury, which determines whether to indict the officers involved in the shooting.187 The Seattle district attorney holds a public hearing in which the officers
involved in the shooting and the family of the deceased individual are represented by counsel.188 A jury determines the facts of the case, and a chief
county prosecutor decides whether the officer is criminally liable for the
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

See Clark County, Nev., Ordinance 3567 (Dec. 4, 2007).
Lisa Kim Bach, ACLU Chief Slams Rules, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 21, 2007, at 1B.
Id.
Id.
Goldman, supra note 145.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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death.189 Each city has great discretion to find the method that works best for
its police officers and makes citizens confident in the city’s ability to find the
truth.
The critical issue for the Clark County commissioners is how best to
restore the public’s confidence in the LVMPD’s use of deadly force and in
Clark County’s system to review the LVMPD’s actions. The American legal
system is based on the premise that the best way to find the truth is for an
objective tribunal to oversee proceedings between adversarial parties with zealous representation. Therefore, the coroner’s inquest system should resemble
this format, even though the Clark County Coroner’s inquest process is not
putting the officers on trial, but rather is meant to bring forth the truth publicly
surrounding the LVMPD’s use of deadly force.190 If the Clark County Coroner’s inquest process resembles the traditional American legal system, it will
instill the public with confidence in the system’s ability to reach the truth. Dan
Satterberg, chief of staff to the King County (Seattle, Washington) prosecuting
attorney, essentially agreed with this idea when he said, “Having a hearing with
full participation by all parties tends to reduce the number of civil cases
later.”191 Mr. Satterberg continued, “The potential plaintiffs have seen the witnesses on the stand and heard all the testimony. There aren’t as many unanswered questions later.”192 Therefore, the key to boosting the public’s
confidence in the LVMPD’s use of deadly force and the coroner’s inquest process is to create a system similar to the traditional courtroom format.
The Clark County commissioners got one change correct by requiring the
person acting as hearing master to be someone the public already trusts as an
objective, impartial decision maker (a justice of the peace) instead of a Las
Vegas attorney. However, the Clark County commissioners must make two
additional changes in order to create a fair system in which the public can trust
to bring forth the truth. First, if Clark County retains the prosecutor format as
opposed to an adversarial system, the Clark County district attorney’s office
absolutely cannot prosecute in the hearings due to the close working relationship between the district attorney’s office and the LVMPD. This close working
relationship creates an appearance that the prosecutors will not ask the tough
questions. Second, the families of the individuals killed by LVMPD officers
must have the opportunity to question the officers in front of the jury to give
the proceedings at least an appearance of an adversarial nature and to provide
the jury with the necessary information to come to a well-informed verdict.
This second suggestion is critical to the public’s opinion that the system creates
a meaningful opportunity for the truth to come forth. However, such a change
in questioning necessitates a change in the entire format of the inquests. One
major flaw in the ACLU’s proposal193 is that the officers face questions from
two parties—prosecutors from the attorney general’s office and attorneys repre189

Id.
Clark County Coroner Index, supra note 65.
191 Goldman, supra note 145.
192 Id.
193 The ACLU wanted to replace Clark County district attorneys with prosecutors from the
attorney general’s office, to use justices of the peace as hearing masters instead of local
attorneys, and to allow the decedent’s family members to directly question the officers
190
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senting the decedent’s family—and must fend for themselves without counsel.
Such a system could completely turn the tables from a biased system in the
LVMPD’s favor to a system stacked against the LVMPD from the start.
In order to restore public confidence in the coroner’s inquest process and
to ensure fairness and protection for the LVMPD officers, the Clark County
Commission should change the coroner’s inquest system to resemble the systems used in New York City and Seattle. These two systems do not utilize
prosecutors, but instead provide each side, the officers and the family of the
deceased individual, with counsel and hold a hearing before a jury. The only
substantial difference between the New York City and Seattle systems is in
New York City a grand jury decides whether to indict the officers and in Seattle
a jury determines the facts and the chief prosecutor decides whether the officer
is criminally liable for the death.
The New York City and Seattle systems provide objective, adversarial
methods for revealing the truth. However, slight modifications must be made
to ensure full objectivity and a truly adversarial process. First, attorneys from
the Clark County district attorney’s office should not be appointed to represent
the deceased individual’s family for the same reason those attorneys should not
prosecute the coroner’s inquest under the current system: the district attorney’s
office and the LVMPD work closely together on a daily basis. If attorneys
from the district attorney’s office were allowed to represent the victim’s family,
it could create the appearance that the victim’s family did not receive zealous
representation. Attorneys from the attorney general’s office should represent
both sides in the coroner’s inquest process to ensure zealous representation for
both parties. These recommendations provide representation for the victims’
families and protect LVMPD officers, which solves the major concerns of both
the ALCU and the LVPPA. A switch to an adversarial system from a sole
prosecutor system would also improve Clark County residents’ confidence in
the LVMPD and the County’s ability to find the truth surrounding officerinvolved shootings.
VII. EXPLANATIONS

FOR THE

INCREASE

IN

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS

A variety of societal factors may influence the frequency with which
deadly force is employed in the line of duty. More specifically, several of these
factors can be cited as contributing to the recent outbreak of officer-involved
shootings in Las Vegas. The complexity of this societal problem and its twosided nature—peace officer versus suspect—prevent a single or simple solution. The answer, if one even exists, may lie within an elaborate collage of
social ills, systemic flaws, and individual choices. In addition to, or in lieu of,
social and psychological theories, more pragmatic and tangible reasons may
also account for the increase in officer-involved shootings in Las Vegas.

through counsel. Kihara, Inquest Changes Proposed, supra note 171; Kihara, Inquest
Reform Questioned, supra note 171; Arambulo, supra note 164.
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A. Sociological and Psychological Explanations for the Increase in Las
Vegas Officer-Involved Shootings
The reasons behind the recent pandemic of police shootings in Las Vegas
may lie deep within the social fabric and psychological makeup of the community. Some experts suggest that foundational issues—including the erosion of
the traditional family, the prevalence of violence on television and in other
media outlets, a decrease in respect for authority, and the disappearance of
objective moral standards—have created the increase in officer-involved shootings.194 While those issues may be valid contributors to the problem, they have
been discussed ad nauseum, and the discussions have resulted in very few practical suggestions on how to fix the problem. Other experts have investigated
links to the birth and welfare recipient rates,195 while some have studied possible connections to the divorce and unemployment rates.196
The following sections investigate two potential sociological and psychological causes in Las Vegas: (1) the psychological impact on officers after the
felonious killing of a Las Vegas officer in the line of duty and (2) racial undertones combined with socioeconomic inequalities.
1. Post-Shooting Trauma for Police Officers
Society often forgets that its heroes—most notably police officers,
firefighters, and soldiers—are regular people with feelings, weaknesses, and
psychological difficulties. These individuals deal with very traumatic experiences, or critical incidents, that others rarely witness besides on the evening
news or in newspapers. Officers often resist treatment for the psychological
effects of critical incidents, such as the death of a fellow officer, to avoid
appearing weak.197 After an officer in the same police department has been
feloniously killed, officers may be more likely to respond to difficult situations
with lethal force.
The murder of Officer Prendes in February 2006 was perhaps the first time
many of the LVMPD’s young officers ever witnessed the death of a fellow
officer. The LVMPD officers, on average, are only twenty-eight years old and
have just four years of experience on the force.198 Civil rights groups and the
media suggested the possibility that LVMPD officers are now more apt to shoot
earlier than they were before the Prendes murder.199 LVMPD Sheriff Bill
Young objected to those assertions,200 but the murders of Swuave Lopez and
Tarance Hall illustrate some degree of a shoot-first attitude.201 However, the
194

Joseph J. Simeone, Duty, Power, and Limits of Police Use of Deadly Force in Missouri,
21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 123, 178-82 (2002).
195 See Kania & Mackey, supra note 4, at 33, 41.
196 See Lester, Predicting, supra note 4, at 43.
197 Arthur W. Kureczka, Critical Incident Stress in Law Enforcement, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., Feb.-Mar. 1996, at 10, 12.
198 Don Woutat, Las Vegas Sees Rise in Officers Shooting Suspects, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 30, 2006, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/nation/stories/
DN-vegasdog_30nat.ART.State.Bulldog.2524414.html.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
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same phenomenon took place in Philadelphia in 2006 after an officer was shot
and killed in May. Through mid-August 2006, Philadelphia police killed sixteen people, which surpassed any single annual total of people killed over the
previous twenty-five years in Philadelphia.202 Thus, the death of Officer
Prendes could have affected the decisions made by LVMPD officers when
faced with various dangerous situations on Las Vegas streets.
The LVMPD must take affirmative measures to ensure the mental health
of its officers because personally unstable officers equipped with the authority
to use deadly weapons create a dangerous situation for Las Vegas residents and
tourists. The murder of a fellow officer may result in an added measure of fear
and logically increases the level of danger perceived by officers who patrol the
streets. Officers are not unflappable, and increased access to counseling would
help protect the mental health and stability of each officer. Therefore, the
LVMPD should provide either mandatory counseling or a more discrete
method to obtain counseling for all officers after extreme events such as the
death of an officer, a major shootout, or any other unusually violent civilian
encounter.
2. Racial Undertones Combined with Socioeconomic Inequalities of
Races
Violent police-citizen encounters have a long, deep-rooted history that
originated with the beginning of organized police forces in America. In the
northern states, some social theorists contend that cities organized police forces
primarily to guard the property, wealth, and position of the upper classes.203 In
the southern states, early policing consisted of all White males possessing the
power to stop, question, and apprehend African Americans under the slave
codes.204 Police violence against African Americans, however, has continued
throughout American history and has not disappeared even in today’s environment of heightened racial tolerance and equality. One study showed that over a
two-year period, nearly 90% of police brutality victims were African American
while almost 93% of the officers involved were White.205 Other studies
showed that with a constant crime rate across cities, the fear of crime by citizens varies with the size of the African American community.206 Thus, the size
of the African American population in a city may influence the number of
officer-involved shootings by that city’s police force because a largely White
police force may feel threatened by the African American community.
The recent outbreak of deadly force used by the LVMPD officers may
have at least some of its roots in Las Vegas’s racial composition. One study
202 Rise in Police-Involved Shootings Raises Concern in Las Vegas, USA TODAY, Aug. 15,
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-08-15-vegas-police-shootings_x.htm.
203 See JOE R. FEAGIN & HARLAN HAHN, GHETTO REVOLTS: THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE IN
AMERICAN CITIES (1973); TONY PLATT ET AL., THE IRON FIST AND THE VELVET GLOVE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. POLICE (3d. ed. 1982).
204 See BLACKS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Charles E. Owens & Jimmy Bell eds., 1977).
205 Kim Michelle Lersch & Joe R. Feagin, Violent Police-Citizen Encounters: An Analysis
of Major Newspaper Accounts, 22 CRITICAL SOC. 29, 38 (1996).
206 See David Jacobs & Robert M. O’Brien, The Determinants of Deadly Force: A Structural Analysis of Police Violence, 103 AM. J. SOC. 837, 857-58 (1998); Allen E. Liska et al.,
Fear of Crime as a Social Fact, 60 SOC. FORCES 760 (1982).
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showed that African Americans were victims in 53% of all killings by police in
the United States.207 Of the nine people shot and killed by LVMPD officers
through July 9, 2006, five were African American (56%), one was Hispanic
(11%), and three were White (33%).208 In Clark County, African Americans
make up approximately 11% of the population.209 Nationally, African Americans account for 13% of the population and 17% of the population in the thirtyeight U.S. counties with more than one million people.210 Thus, the percentage
of African American fatalities from officer-involved shootings in Clark County
(56%) is greater than the national average (53%) even though the African
American population in Clark County (11%) is smaller than the national average (13%). Additionally, between 1990 and 2000, the African American community in Las Vegas grew by 73% while the White population only grew by
49%.211 This data suggests that race and the growing minority population may
contribute to the LVMPD’s surge of officer-involved shootings.
Similar to racial considerations, scholars assert the existence of economically unequal classes of citizens as a factor that leads to increased use of deadly
force by police officers. One argument alleges that the greater the economic
stratification, the greater the need for the dominant class to coerce the norms
that guarantee their continued control.212 A statistical study of fatal police
shootings in 170 U.S. cities identified economic racial inequality as one of the
leading explanations for the use of deadly force by police.213 Therefore, it
appears that a combination of a large or growing minority population and
socioeconomic inequalities between races may create a situation more likely to
result in use of deadly force by police.
The racial socioeconomic stratification in Las Vegas also supports an
environment for a greater number of officer-involved killings. In Las Vegas,
nearly 17% of African American households make less than $10,000 annually,
which is over two times greater than the Las Vegas average (7.8%) and nearly
three times greater than the percentage of White households in that income
207

See Jacobs & O’Brien, supra note 206, at 843.
McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9; McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting,
supra note 9.
209 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases Population Estimates by
Race, Hispanic Origin and Age for States and Counties, Table 2 (Aug. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2006/cb06-123table2.xls.
210 Id.; Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases Population Estimates
by Race, Hispanic Origin and Age for States and Counties, Table 1 (Aug. 4, 2006), available
at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2006/cb06-123table1.xls.
211 The percent change figures reflect growth in the African American and White populations. The African American, not of Hispanic origin, population rose from 28,704 in 1990 to
49,570 in 2000 while the White, not of Hispanic origin, population rose from 186,232 in
1990 to 277,704 in 2000. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: NEVADA 11, available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/cen1990/cp1/cp-1-30.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, Las Vegas city, Nevada – DP-1, Profile
of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QT
Table?_bm=&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_DP1&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-_lang=
en&-geo_id=16000US3240000.
212 WILLIAM CHAMBLISS & ROBERT SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER, AND POWER (2d ed. 1982).
213 Jacobs & O’Brien, supra note 206, at 857.
208
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category (6.4%).214 On the other end of the spectrum, the percentage of White
households making more than $150,000 per year (5.3%) is over three-and-onehalf times higher than the same income level for African American households
(1.5%).215 Therefore, Las Vegas has significant economic racial inequality that
may contribute to the high number of officer-involved shootings. The following two figures show the distribution of household incomes by race in Las
Vegas, focusing only on the differences between three of the many races in Las
Vegas.
FIGURE 4: HOUSEHOLD INCOME

BY

RACE

IN

LAS VEGAS, TABLE (2000)216

Household Income

White

AfricanAmerican

Hispanic

Las Vegas
Average

Less than $10,000

6.4%

16.6%

7.6%

7.8%

$10,000 to $14,999

4.9%

8.7%

5.8%

5.4%

$15,000 to $24,999

11.0%

16.7%

16.9%

12.6%

$25,000 to $34,999

11.9%

15.0%

16.4%

13.0%

$35,000 to $49,999

17.2%

15.3%

18.9%

17.4%

$50,000 to $74,999

21.7%

14.9%

20.3%

20.5%

$75,000 to $99,999

12.5%

7.1%

8.4%

11.3%

$100,000 to $149,999

9.1%

4.3%

3.9%

7.7%

$150,000 or more

5.3%

1.5%

1.8%

4.3%

FIGURE 5: HOUSEHOLD INCOME

BY

RACE

IN

LAS VEGAS, CHART (2000)217

25.00%

White
African-American
Hispanic
Average

20.00%
15.00%
10.00%

214

$150,000 or
more

$75,000 to
$99,999

$50,000 to
$74,999

$35,000 to
$49,999

$25,000 to
$34,999

$15,000 to
$24,999

$10,000 to
$14,999

Less than
$10,000

0.00%

$100,000 to
$149,999

5.00%

Nevada State Data Center, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Income Profile 1, 4,
8 (on file with the Nevada Law Journal).
215 Id. at 4, 8.
216 Id. at 1, 7-8; U.S. Census Bureau, Table DP-3.
Profile of Selected Social
Characteristics, Las Vegas, Nev. (2000), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/
dptables/2k320065.xls.
217 U.S. Census Bureau, Table DP-3, supra note 216; Nevada State Data Center, supra note
214, at 1, 4, 7-8.
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Unfortunately, racial tension is inextricably intertwined within the historical social fabric of our nation despite the enormous achievements made by the
civil rights movement over the past several decades. In today’s mainstream
society, blatant racism is rightfully abhorred, but the effects of hidden, personal
racist feelings may persist. The reaches of racism stretch across our nation with
Las Vegas being no exception. The City of Las Vegas must take affirmative
steps to root out this oft hidden evil that manifests itself in dangerous ways,
such as officer-involved shootings. Las Vegas must take action at the foundational, professional, and accountability levels of the racial problem.
At the foundational level, Las Vegas can decrease the overall amount of
racial misconception and misunderstanding among its citizens by incorporating
an increased amount of racial tolerance and understanding into the local school
system. Children are not born to be racist and only differentiate on the basis of
color once they learn such behavior in the home, through the media, or at
school. Racism in homes is virtually uncorrectable by the government—at
least through an immediate remedy. Today’s media generally embraces diversity and encourages people to recognize the equality of all human beings.
Schools create a unique and fertile learning environment in the area of
diversity because students leave their homes and must meet people with whom
they may not otherwise associate. Depending on each student’s individual
background, many students may have difficulties adapting to the new, diverse
school environment with which they have never had to deal. Schools must
teach their students to get along with all class members by embracing physical
and intellectual diversity. The Clark County School District should implement
social skills groups, interracial activities, and other programs to educate students about racial equality. The lessons of reading, writing, and arithmetic will
prove much more beneficial through each student’s life when joined with tolerance and understanding. In order to provide a solution to the number of
officer-involved shootings in Las Vegas, we must realize that tomorrow’s
LVMPD officers are today’s students.
At the professional level, Las Vegas must improve the training of its
officers by including racial instruction for all current and new LVMPD officers.
The LVMPD needs to ensure that any racial animosity harbored by the officers
will not impair their ability to perform police duties appropriately. One law
enforcement officer who allows racism to carry over into work becomes a detriment to the progress of racial relations in our community. As statistics show,
racism may play a tragic role in the degree of haste used when determining
whether to use deadly force. Additionally, any hint of racially motivated treatment during police duties gives citizens of minority races less confidence in the
police. Finally, police officers discriminating on the basis of race may lead to
an impression of state-sponsored racism, which could lead to minorities
resenting all government action. To prevent these negative results, the
LVMPD must take active measures to make sure that race will not play a role
in how officers carry out their duties.
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Improvements in procedures at the accountability level would create
immediate results in the number of use-of-force incidents against minorities in
Las Vegas. Admittedly, the two previous levels would likely produce longterm, though hard to quantify, benefits to Las Vegas and any other city that
chooses to implement the recommendations. However, a change in how the
LVMPD reviews use-of-force incidents could instantly reduce the number of
minorities who end up dead at the hands of police officers. The LVMPD’s Use
of Force Review Board should tighten its standards of review, especially for
instances where the race of the victim differs from the race of the officer
involved. If the LVMPD is wary of adding scrutiny to the review in only a
handful of defined situations, then the review process should include a routine
inquiry regarding any possible racial motivations.
The LVMPD should also implement a more independent and adversarial
method of scrutinizing an officer’s use of deadly force.218 Currently, two
mechanisms are in place to review officers’ use of deadly force—the LVMPD
UFRB and the Clark County Coroner inquest process. Each Use of Force
Board is made up of four trained civilians randomly selected from a pool of
sixty, a captain who does not supervise the officer under review, the officer’s
training captain, and an officer of the same rank who has not worked with the
officer under review.219 The Clark County Coroner’s inquest process also
serves as a check on the officer’s decision to use deadly force. However, both
procedures are non-adversarial, fact-finding exercises that many citizens do not
trust to find all the facts. The American legal system is based on the premise
that an adversarial system produces the truth, yet the Clark County Coroner and
the LVMPD utilize systems in which officers make seemingly unchallenged
claims regarding their own actions in connection with the death of a person.
The rash of recent officer-involved shootings and perceived lack of impartiality
has shaken Las Vegans’ confidence in the current accountability mechanisms.
Because the LVMPD UFRB is an internal check, a change to the Clark County
Coroner’s inquest process is more appropriate due to its public nature.220 Public confidence in the coroner inquest process would increase and the number of
officer-involved shootings would likely decrease if counsel for the family of
the individuals killed were allowed to question the officers involved in the incident because officers would at least appear more accountable for their use of
deadly force.
Las Vegas must also take steps to improve the socioeconomic status of the
minority population. No quick and easy fix exists to pull the city out of the
racial economic stratification that we now face, but two long-term efforts may
alleviate part of the problem. First, the school district must make a serious
effort to provide quality education to all areas within the district. The quality

218
219
220

See supra Part VI.B.
McCabe, supra note 65.
See supra Part VI.B.
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of education should not be determined by the socioeconomic status of the
neighborhood. The City cannot directly solve the problem of poor households
but can improve the opportunities for its citizens to help themselves. Nevada
provides many opportunities for children from minority households to obtain a
college education by providing scholarships. However, the elementary and secondary school levels are where children determine whether they will aspire to
attend college. Las Vegas can improve the economic welfare of those households on the lower end of the spectrum by providing quality education to all of
its children.
Las Vegas should also improve the economic situation of the poorest
households by devoting substantial time and resources to cleaning up the poor,
crime-filled neighborhoods that contain a higher concentration of minority
households. Children from bad neighborhoods often lack hope for a better life
and get caught up in criminal activities that thwart their potential to become
productive members of their community. Additionally, children who fear for
their safety while attending school often learn much less and perform more
poorly on the standardized tests required to attend college. In order to improve
conditions in poorer neighborhoods, Las Vegas should establish enhanced community centers, much like the settlement houses of the late nineteenth century
that were based on the belief that poverty resulted from numerous social conditions, including lack of access to education, nutrition, health care, and housing.221 The Las Vegas community would benefit by establishing communitybased, not-for-profit222 centers that provide services such as child care, activities for all age groups, cultural and recreational experiences, services for job
seekers, parent support groups, meals and snacks, and preschool programs.223
Community centers such as this would help to improve notoriously bad neighborhoods in Las Vegas and alleviate the perpetuation of racial economic stratification. As Las Vegas moves closer to racial economic equality, the number
of officer-involved shootings will decrease and many other social benefits will
flow therefrom.
B. Empirical Explanations for the Increase in Las Vegas Officer-Involved
Shootings
While psychological, racial, and socioeconomic circumstances between
officers and suspects in Las Vegas may create very real tension, empirical fac221 Suzy E. Edelstein & Irma Rodriguez, Honoring Our Roots in Settlements Today (Oct.
2003), http://www.naswnyc.org/HonoringOurRoots.htm. The settlement houses of the late
nineteenth century, like Jane Addam’s Hull House, were created in an effort to close the
social gap between classes and increase needed resources for underserved populations. Eleanor M. Klosterman & Dorothy C. Stratton, Speaking Truth to Power: Jane Addam’s Values
Base for Peacemaking, 21 J. WOMEN & SOC. WORK 158, 160 (2006).
222 Unlike the first settlement houses that were funded primarily by private donations, notfor-profit community centers across the United States are now largely funded by the government. Barbara Trainin Blank, Settlement Houses: Old Idea in New Form Builds Communities, NEW SOC. WORKER, Summer 1998, at 4, 7, available at http://www.socialworker.com/
settleme.htm.
223 Id. at 6. Community centers such as the one described currently operate throughout the
United States in places such as New York, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Cleveland, Ohio; Salem, Massachusetts; and Columbus, Ohio. Id. at 4-7.
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tors could provide more tangible answers with simpler solutions. This section
attempts to reveal connections between the number of fatal officer-involved
shootings and certain statistical and tangible categories including the following:
(1) the violent crime and homicide rates in Las Vegas, (2) the strength of
Nevada’s criminal penalties, (3) the rapidly increasing population of Las
Vegas, and (4) the number of the LVMPD officers in relation to the growing
Las Vegas population.
1. Violent Crime and Homicide Rates
One rather intuitive argument might be that as the overall numbers of violent crimes or homicides increase, the number of officer-involved shootings
will also increase. It logically follows that as more individuals commit violent
crimes or homicides punishable by lengthy prison sentences, those individuals
will be more likely to take greater measures to evade arrest. Scholars have also
argued under the danger-perception theory that the number of officer-involved
shootings depends on the amount of real or perceived danger police officers
experience.224 Another argument is the ratio-threat model, which claims
officer-involved shootings are merely a function of the overall level of real or
perceived violence in society.225 Thus, the violent crime and homicide rates
are typically the best measures of real violence in society and may provide
some insight into the number of officer-involved shootings in any given city.
A cursory inspection of the violent crime and homicide rates in Las Vegas
and the number of justifiable homicides by police officers over the past five
years, as compared to the national numbers over the same period, appears to
show no direct relationship between the three statistics. From 2001 to 2002,
the violent crime rate in Las Vegas increased by over 15% and the homicide
rate remained the same, but the number of justifiable homicides by LVMPD
officers remained unchanged. Additionally, from 2003 to 2004, the violent
crime rate in Las Vegas increased by 2.5% and the homicide rate decreased by
11%, yet the number of officer-involved fatal shootings increased by 25%.
Therefore, it appears that the violent crime rate and the overall homicide rate do
not accurately predict the number of justifiable homicides by police in Las
Vegas. The following figure compares the violent crime rates, homicide rates,
and number of fatal shootings by police in Las Vegas and the United States
from 2001 through 2006.

224 John M. MacDonald et al., The Temporal Relationship Between Police Killings of Civilians and Criminal Homicide: A Refined Version of the Danger-Perception Theory, 47
CRIME & DELINQ. 155, 159 (2001).
225 Id.
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FIGURE 6: VIOLENT CRIME RATE COMPARED WITH JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES
PER YEAR (NEVADA AND NATIONWIDE)
Location

Las Vegas

Statistic

2001

226

2002

227

2003

228

2004

229

2005

230

2006

231

Violent Crime
232
Rate

675.4

778.6

770.0

789.1

743.5

982.9

Homicide Rate

11.9

11.9

11.9

10.6

11.3

11.6

Fatal Shootings by
233
Police

7

7

9

10

9

9

Violent Crime Rate

504.5

494.4

475.8

463.2

469.0

473.5

5.6

5.6

5.7

5.5

5.6

5.7

378

341

373

367

341

376

United States Homicide Rate
Fatal Shootings by
234
Police

The data does not show a direct causal connection between fluctuations in
the violent crime and homicide rates and the number of fatal officer-involved
shootings in Las Vegas. However, the data shows that Las Vegas has elevated
rates of violent crime and homicide, which may explain the high number of
fatal shootings by police in Las Vegas. Additional research into crime rates
and the number of fatal officer-involved shootings may find a link between the
two statistics. However, crime statistics only reflect actual danger and cannot
226 FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES –
2001, at 76-86 tbl.5, 118-64 tbl.8 (2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/
01crime.pdf [herinafter 2001 CRIME REPORT] .
227 FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES –
2002, at 78-88 tbl.5, 120-65 tbl.8 (2003), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/pdf/02
crime.pdf [hereinafter 2002 CRIME REPORT].
228 FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES –
2003, at 82-92 tbl.5, 131-78 tbl.8 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/
toc03.pdf [hereinafter 2003 CRIME REPORT].
229 FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES –
2004, at 76-85 tbl.4, 136-83 tbl.8 (2005), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/
documents/CIUS2004.pdf [hereinafter 2004 CRIME REPORT].
230 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.1, supra note 5; FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2005, at tbl.4 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.
gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_04.html; FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2005, at tbl.8 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05
cius/data/table_08_nv.html [hereinafter 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.8]; 2005 CRIME REPORT
tbl.13, supra note 6.
231 FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES –
2006, at tbl.1 (2007), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_01.html; FBI,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2006, at
tbl.8 (Nev.) (2007), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_08_nv.html
[hereinafter 2006 CRIME REPORT tbl.8 (Nev.)]; FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2006, at tbl.13 (2007), available at http://www.
fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_13.html [hereinafter
2006 CRIME REPORT tbl.13].
232 Violent crimes include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, and aggravated
assault. The rate is the number of violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. See 2002 CRIME
REPORT, supra note 227, at 78.
233 Kihara, supra note 88; McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9; McCabe,
Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9.
234 2006 CRIME REPORT tbl.13, supra note 231; Homicide Trends in the U.S., supra note 6.
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quantify the level of danger perceived by Las Vegas officers. Las Vegas has a
well-known history of mobster ties and the violence that comes with organized
crime.235 The recent “What happens here, stays here” ad campaign promotes
the idea that Las Vegas is a place where people commit adultery, cheat, and
steal.236 Thus, the level of perceived danger may be even higher than the level
of danger reflected in crime statistics. In fact, LVMPD officers may sometimes
react based on a high level of perceived danger instead of the amount of real
danger, which may result in a higher number of fatal officer-involved shootings. A study regarding the level of danger perceived by LVMPD officers
would shed more light on whether perceived danger affects the number of fatal
officer-involved shootings in Las Vegas.
2. Strength of Nevada’s Criminal Penalties
Another pragmatic argument for the increase in justifiable homicides by
Las Vegas police officers is that more criminals have moved to Las Vegas due
to lax criminal laws in Nevada. Officer Laurie Bisch, a thirteen-year LVMPD
veteran and recent candidate for Clark County Sheriff, told the Las Vegas
Review-Journal that Las Vegas has a reputation with criminals from California
and Arizona as being an easy place to get away with crimes.237 Bisch
explained, “[Criminals] think it’s easy to beat the system here. In California,
they are tough with their three-strikes rule, and Arizona has tough new laws
that are keeping criminals in jail for longer periods of time. [Las] Vegas is
often the place of choice for these criminals.”238 Individuals who intend to
commit criminal acts on a regular basis would obviously find it advantageous
to move their operations to a neighboring state with more lenient criminal laws.
Nevada’s allegedly lenient criminal laws may have helped turn Las Vegas into
the career criminal’s preferred location. A detailed comparison of the Nevada
Criminal Code to the California, Arizona, and Utah criminal codes and the
crime rates of those neighboring states are necessary to determine whether
Officer Bisch’s assertion carries substantial weight.
On the other hand, the actual deterrent effect of longer prison terms and
overall tougher criminal penalties is questionable at best. One study showed
that most people, even career criminals, do not have an accurate understanding

235 Jerry Fink, Tropicana’s Closing Shuts Door on History, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 2, 2006,
at 9; PBS, American Experience, Las Vegas: An Unconventional History, http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/amex/lasvegas/peopleevents/p_syndicate.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
236 Steve Friess, A Firm Hits Jackpot on Las Vegas Ads, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2004, at
A14; Chris Jones, ‘What Happens Here, Stays Here’ Strikes Sour Note for Some at Conference, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 18, 2003, at 1A.
237 McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9. Officer Bisch also ran for Clark
County Sheriff in 2006. Laurie Bisch for Clark County Sheriff 2006, http://www.lauriebisch
forsheriff.com/index.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
238 McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9.
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of the law.239 Lawmakers often believe that their greatest crime-deterring tool
is the length of prison terms attached to the targeted crime.240 However, one
study suggested that punishment’s effectiveness hinges on the intensity of the
experience rather than its duration. Thus, the overall deterrent effect of prison
sentences may decrease as the length of the terms increase.241 Therefore, the
alleged leniency of Nevada’s criminal laws may not have any significant
impact on the amount of crime in Las Vegas or the number of officer-involved
shootings.
3. The Las Vegas Population Explosion
Officers have argued that the massive influx of people into the Las Vegas
Valley has created a situation for a natural increase in crime and the number of
officer-involved shootings. From 1990 to 2000, Nevada experienced the largest growth rate (66%) of all fifty states, and Las Vegas grew faster (83%) than
any other metropolitan area in the country.242 On June 21, 2006, the United
States Census Bureau released its list of the fasting growing cities in the country on which North Las Vegas ranked second, Henderson ranked twentieth,
Reno ranked thirtieth, and Las Vegas ranked forty-second.243 The frequency of
officer-involved shootings may logically increase with more people in the valley and more police officers patrolling the streets.
LVMPD Officer Laurie Bisch recently argued this theory in a statement to
the Las Vegas media. Bisch said, “With the population growth there comes a
whole new element, and those criminals are brazen.”244 A cursory glance at
the number of officers feloniously killed in Nevada compared to the population
growth in Nevada shows little relationship between the two statistics (see Figure 7 below). Additionally, a more recent and narrow comparison of the population growth in Las Vegas to the number of justifiable homicides by Las
Vegas police officers provides no clarification on the issue (see Figure 8
below).

239 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 174 (2004).
240 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 954 (2003).
241 Id. at 955.
242 MARC J. PERRY & PAUL J. MACKUN, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: POPULATION CHANGE AND
DISTRIBUTION 2, 6 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-2.
pdf.
243 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Elk Grove, Calif., Named Fastest-Growing City, at
tbl. 1, (June 21, 2006), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2006/cb0695table1.pdf; Les Christie, Fastest Growing Cities, CNN.COM, June 21, 2006, http://money.
cnn.com/2006/06/20/real_estate/fastest_growing_cities/index.htm.
244 McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9.
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FIGURE 7: OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED IN NEVADA COMPARED
NEVADA POPULATION PER DECADE (1860-2007)245
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FIGURE 8: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY LVMPD OFFICERS COMPARED
LAS VEGAS POPULATION (2001-2006)246
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Furthermore, a comparison of Las Vegas to other cities across the country
shows no obvious connection between population and justifiable homicides by
police. Therefore, the population growth may be one factor, but by itself does
not shed any significant light on what might be causing the officer-involved
245 PERRY & MACKUN, supra note 242, at 2; The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc.,
Nevada, supra note 68; U.S. Census Bureau, Table 16, Population: 1790 to 1990, http://
www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-16.pdf.
246 2006 CRIME REPORT tbl.8 (Nev.), supra note 231; 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.8, supra note
230; 2004 CRIME REPORT, supra note 229, at 136-83 tbl.8; 2003 CRIME REPORT, supra note
228, at 131-78 tbl.8; 2002 CRIME REPORT, supra note 227, at 120-65 tbl.8; 2001 CRIME
REPORT, supra note 226, at 118-64 tbl.8; Kihara, supra note 88; McCabe, Officer-Involved
Shootings, supra note 9; McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9; McCabe, supra
note 87.
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shooting problem. The following figure compares the number of fatal officerinvolved shootings in Las Vegas and in ten other cities across the United States
during 2005 and the first part of 2006.
FIGURE 9: OFFICER-INVOLVED FATAL SHOOTINGS IN VARIOUS UNITED
STATES CITIES (2005-2006)247
Jurisdiction
LVMPD
San Jose, Calif.
San Francisco
Austin, Texas
Portland, Ore.

2006248
9
0
2
1
0

2005
9
2
0
1
3

Population 2005
1,281,698
910,528
749,172
693,019
540,389

Oklahoma City
Los Angeles
Gary, Ind.
Philadelphia
Nashville
Houston

1
6
0
15
1
3

3
11
1
2
3
8

531,688
3,871,077
100,065
1,472,915
557,034
2,045,732

The rapid population growth in Las Vegas provides many benefits to the
City, such as economic stimulation, more jobs, and higher tax revenues. The
City should not take measures to slow the population growth despite any possible link between the rapid growth and an increase in the number of officerinvolved shootings. The City of Las Vegas and the LVMPD should take steps
to better adjust to the population growth even though the data does not reflect a
direct causal link between population growth and the number of officerinvolved shootings.
4. More Officers, Please!
The rapid population growth could create community imbalances, such as
a decline in the officer to citizen ratio, if Las Vegas fails to respond adequately
to the growth. Officer Bisch asserted that growth in the number of LVMPD
officers has not kept pace with the rapid population increase. Bisch explained,
“We used to have two to three officers handling a call. Now there may be only
one officer.”249 Officers may be more nervous or on-edge when arriving alone
at a crime scene, especially if the officer is outnumbered by the suspected
criminals. Suspects may be more likely to resist authority and elevate the violence with a single officer than they would be if two or three officers arrived at
247 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.8, supra note 230; McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra
note 9; McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9.
248 The 2006 figures include year-to-date statistics through July 9, 2006, for the LVMPD
and through July 6, 2006, for the other ten cities. See McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings,
supra note 9; McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9.
249 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.8, supra note 230; McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra
note 9.
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the scene. Additionally, suspects may be more likely to resist arrest or try to
escape when they outnumber the officers at the scene. One study investigated
the relationship between the number of arrestees at the scene and the likelihood
of an arrestee resisting arrest.250 The data shows a negative relationship
between the number of arrestees at the scene and the amount of resisting arrest;
however, the author suggests skewed results due to incomplete data regarding
the number of backup officers.251 Therefore, the relationship between the presence of multiple arrestees and resisting arrest remains questionable.252
A look at the statistics shows that Officer Bisch may be on the right track.
The following figure shows the Las Vegas population, the number of LVMPD
officers, the Violent Crime Rate, and the number of officer-involved fatal
shootings in the years 2001 to 2006. The violent crime rate surged from 2001
to 2002 and has stayed approximately the same since 2002. However, the number of officers per 10,000 inhabitants has decreased by nearly six percent over
the past five years.
FIGURE 10: LAS VEGAS POPULATION GROWTH AND INCREASE
LVMPD OFFICERS (2001-2006)

IN

NUMBER

OF

2001253 2002254 2003255 2004256 2005257 2006258
Las Vegas Population (in
millions)

1.12

1.15

1.19

1.24

1.28

1.32

Number of LVMPD Officers

1,895

1,951

1,981

2,007

2,053

2,231

Officers per 10,000 inhabitants

17.0

16.9

16.7

16.2

16.0

17.0

Violent Crime Rate

675.4

778.6

770.0

789.1

743.5

982.9

7

7

9

10

9

9260

Officer-Involved Fatal
Shootings259

The next figure shows the compounded percent change of the population
and number of LVMPD officers from 2001 to each subsequent year. This chart
illustrates how the number of officers failed to keep pace with the population
growth from 2001 to 2005. During the four-year period, the Las Vegas popula250 John Kavanagh, The Occurrence of Resisting Arrest in Arrest Encounters: A Study of
Police-Citizen Violence, 22 CRIM. JUST. REV. 16, 31 (1997).
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 2001 Crime Report, supra note 226, at 118-64 tbl.8, 363.
254 2002 CRIME REPORT, supra note 227, at 120-65 tbl.8, 369.
255 2003 CRIME REPORT, supra note 228, at 131-78 tbl.8, 411.
256 2004 CRIME REPORT, supra note 229, at 136-83 tbl.8, 417.
257 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.8, supra note 230; FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2005, at tbl.78 (Nev.) (2006), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_78_nv.html [hereinafter 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.78].
258 2006 CRIME REPORT tbl.8 (Nev.), supra note 231; FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES – 2006, at tbl.78 (Nev.) (2007), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_78_nv.html.
259 Kihara, supra note 88; McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9; McCabe,
Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9.
260 The nine officer-involved fatal shootings occurred by July 9, 2006. See Kihara, supra
note 88; McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting, supra note 9.
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tion increased at nearly twice the rate as the number of LVMPD officers. However, in 2006, the LVMPD added 178 officers to finally catch up with the
population growth and alleviate the growing pressure on an overwhelmed
LVMPD police force (see Figure 11 below).
FIGURE 11: THE CUMULATIVE GROWTH IN LAS VEGAS POPULATION
NUMBER OF LVMPD OFFICERS (2001-2006)261
20.0%

Las Vegas Population Growth
LVMPD Officer Growth

18.0%

AND THE

17.7% 17.7%

14.7%

16.0%
14.0%
10.9%

12.0%
10.0%

8.3%

8.0%

6.4%
4.5%

6.0%
4.0%

5.9%

3.2% 3.0%

2.0%
0.0%
2001-2002

2002-2003

2003-2004

2004-2005

2005-2006

Year

The next figure compares the population, number of officers, officers per
10,000 inhabitants, violent crime rate, and justifiable homicides by police in
several large cities across the country. All numbers are from 2005. Las Vegas
had the second-lowest officer to population ratio among the eleven cities,
which ranged from approximately 100,000 to nearly 4,000,000 people. Las
Vegas also had the second highest number of officer-involved fatal shootings
despite having the fifth lowest violent crime rate.

261

See sources cited for Figure 10, supra notes 253-60.
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FIGURE 12: OFFICER TO POPULATION RATIOS, VIOLENT CRIME RATES, AND
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY POLICE IN TWELVE U.S. CITIES (2005)262

City, State
San Jose, CA

Population

Total
Officers

Officers per
10,000
inhabitants

Violent
Crime Rate

Justifiable
Homicides
by Police

910,528

1,349

14.8

383.5

2

1,281,698

2,053

16.0

743.5

9

Portland, OR

540,389

989

18.3

713.9

3

Oklahoma City, OK

531,688

989

18.6

853.5

3

Austin, TX

693,019

1,361

19.6

489.6

1

Nashville, TN

557,034

1,244

22.3

1,611.0

3

Houston, TX

2,045,732

4,779

23.4

1,172.5

8

Los Angeles, CA

LVMPD

3,871,077

9,355

24.2

820.6

11

Gary, IN

100,065

272

27.2

717.5

1

San Francisco, CA

749,172

2,193

29.3

798.9

0

1,472,915

6,636

45.1

1,467.1

2

Philadelphia, PA

Based on all of the figures above, the decreasing officer to population ratio
was an obvious problem in Las Vegas. However, the number of officerinvolved fatal shootings has stayed virtually the same with the declining citizen-officer ratio from 2001 to 2005 and has spiked in early 2006. Therefore,
the decrease in officers per citizen has not conclusively led to the increase in
justifiable homicides by Las Vegas police officers. Further research on the
relationship between the citizen-officer ratio and the number of fatal officerinvolved shootings is necessary to determine whether any link exists between
the two statistics.
Las Vegas must increase the size of the LVMPD at a higher rate to keep
pace with the astounding population growth because a larger police force will
effectively deter crime and may lead to a decline in the number of fatal officerinvolved shootings. One study found that even moderate levels of punishment
adequately deter crime when coupled with a greater likelihood of being
caught.263 Las Vegas can increase the likelihood of criminals being caught by
increasing the number of LVMPD officers and establishing more local police
substations in the City’s newly developed areas. However, the LVMPD
recently experienced difficulties in recruiting officers, especially high quality
officers, due to the relatively low pay earned by LVMPD officers and disputed
contract negotiations.264 Despite these difficulties, a stronger police presence
in Las Vegas would improve crime deterrence and ultimately lower the number
of officer-involved shootings.
262 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.8, supra note 230; 2005 CRIME REPORT tbl.78, supra note 257;
McCabe, Officer-Involved Shootings, supra note 9; McCabe, Fatal LV Police Shooting,
supra note 9.
263 Robinson & Darley, supra note 240, at 977.
264 Frank Geary, Panel Votes Down Police Contract, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 25, 2005, at
1A.
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CONCLUSION

The post-Garner Nevada statutes have certainly imposed greater restrictions on the use of deadly force by officers and citizens than did the common
law. Despite the increased statutory limitations, the LVMPD’s use of deadly
force in Las Vegas spiked in early 2006. The most likely reasons appear to be
racial tensions between suspects and officers, racial economic stratification,
and the rapid population growth without an equal response in police force
growth.
Las Vegas needs to improve race relations, racial perceptions, racial economic stratification, and counseling services for LVMPD officers. The Clark
County School District should organize programs and courses focused on racial
equality education. Las Vegas needs to combat racial economic stratification
by providing quality education to all children regardless of a neighborhood’s
economic makeup. The LVMPD must include thorough racial instruction for
officers and root out officers who act with racist motivations by implementing
racial checks in the use-of-force review procedures. Additionally, Las Vegas
must establish community centers in poor neighborhoods to supply much
needed aid and educational opportunities for underprivileged families. The
LVMPD must also create better methods for officers to cope with tragic events,
such as the death of a fellow officer, to prevent the mental instability of an
officer from adversely affecting the level of force used. The implementation of
these changes in Las Vegas will alleviate racial tensions, reduce the racial economic stratification, and prevent LVMPD officers from becoming mentally or
emotionally unstable.
In Las Vegas, the violent crime and homicide rates did not appear to have
any direct impact on the number of fatal officer-involved shootings. However,
further research is needed to determine how the level of danger perceived by
officers affects the level of force officers use to effectuate arrests. Nevada’s
criminal punishments do not have a conclusive impact on the level of criminal
activity in Las Vegas or the number of fatal officer-involved shootings. Additionally, the rapid population growth in Las Vegas does not have an obvious
statistical relationship with the number of fatal officer-involved shootings.
However, the ratio of LVMPD officers to Las Vegas residents steadily declined
over the past several years, which resulted in a thinning of law enforcement
resources. Las Vegas must increase the LVMPD’s officer to citizen ratio to
decrease the likelihood of officer-involved shootings.
Further, the Clark County Commission must further amend the coroner’s
inquest process to make Las Vegans confident in the government’s ability to
review the LVMPD officers’ use of deadly force objectively. The coroner’s
inquest system should resemble the adversarial process by providing each side
with zealous representation from impartial attorneys. If the Clark County Commission makes these additional changes, Las Vegans’ confidence in the integrity of the coroner’s inquest system will increase and citizens will feel safer
knowing that LVMPD officers cannot misuse deadly force without facing
appropriate consequences.
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Las Vegas needs to recognize that the increase in officer-involved shootings is a problem with numerous potential causes and a complex solution.
Additional research is necessary to determine the full impact of the causes suggested here. Hopefully this Note can serve as a catalyst for future research and
most importantly for the changes necessary to make Las Vegas a better place in
which to live.

